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I. INTRODUCTION 
How secure are Americans’ electronic communications?  The 
government has the ability to “watch and listen to telephone, e-mail, 
or Internet communication in almost any circumstance, and it can 
power through massive amounts of electronic data in search of 
relevant information almost instantaneously” with the development 
in technology.1  The government has been encroaching on 
Americans’ electronic communications in the name of national 
security since the 1930s.2  Presidents have claimed that they have 
inherent power to authorize warrantless electronic surveillance 
because they have a duty to protect the United States against foreign 
countries.3  National security is important, but so is the individual’s 
privacy.4  Presidents have used surveillance to protect the nation5; 
however, the use of electronic surveillance was not limited to 
protecting the nation.6  Eventually, Congress had to step in to put an 
end to abusive use of electronic surveillance.  The Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA or the Act) provided a 
statutory procedure for the government to conduct electronic 
                                                            
* Kristen Choi is a third-year student at Pepperdine University School of Law.  
She would like to thank the Lord for his guidance.  She would also like to thank her 
family for their endless love, support, and encouragement to pursue her dream.  
And lastly, she would like to thank her best friend, James Lee, for always loving 
her and supporting her through hard times. 
 
1 William C. Banks, The Death of FISA, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1209, 1216 (2007). 
2 Richard Henry Seamon & William Dylan Gardner, The Patriot Act and the 
Wall Between Foreign Intelligence and Law Enforcement, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 319, 330 (2005). 
3 Id. 
4 “The Constitution envisions the protection of individuals from both foreign 
threats and government intrusion and the foreign intelligence purpose requirement 
epitomizes this conflict.”  David Hardin, The Fuss Over Two Small Words: The 
Unconstitutionality of The USA Patriot Act Amendments To FISA Under The 
Fourth Amendment, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 291, 344 (2003). 
5 John Yoo, The Terrorist Surveillance Program and the Constitution, 14 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 565, 588 (2007).  “President Franklin Roosevelt authorized the FBI 
to intercept any communications . . . of persons ‘suspected of subversive activities 
against the [g]overnment . . . .’”  Id.   
6 See infra Part II for discussion of how Presidents in the past have abused the 
surveillance. 
    
446 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 34-2 
surveillance, limiting warrantless electronic surveillance.7  Since the 
passage of FISA in 1978, Congress has passed several statutes 
amending FISA.8  In 2008, Congress passed yet another amendment 
to FISA, which permits the Attorney General and the Director of 
National Intelligence to acquire foreign intelligence information for 
up to one year, by jointly authorizing the surveillance of individuals 
who are reasonably believed to be located outside the United States.9  
Many scholars have debated over the constitutionality of changes to 
FISA, and whether these changes are strengthening or weakening the 
government’s ability to conduct electronic surveillance.10  Other 
scholars have also challenged the constitutionality of changes to 
FISA.  In Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, a group of 
attorneys and human rights, labor, legal, and media organizations 
(collectively Respondents) challenged the constitutionality of the 
FISA Amendments Act.11  In a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court of 
the United States ruled that Respondents—whose work requires them 
to frequently engage in international communications with persons 
not in the United States—lacked standing to challenge the 
amendment to FISA.12 
 In Part II, this note will examine FISA and the amendments to the 
Act in detail, the need for changes to the Act, and briefly provide an 
overview of the Fourth Amendment issue.13  Part III will include 
details of Clapper, including Respondents’ claim and why they 
                                                            
7 Stephanie Cooper Blum, What Really is at Stake with the FISA Amendments 
Act of 2008 and Ideas for Future Surveillance Reform, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 269, 
275 (2009). 
8 See id. at 280 (The U.S.A. Patriot Act amended several provisions of FISA.); 
Robert N. Davis, Striking the Balance: National Security vs. Civil Liberties, 29 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 175, 204 (2003) (The 1994 Amendments to FISA added 
procedures for physical searches.); Brenton Hund, Disappearing Safeguards: FISA 
Nonresident Alien “Loophole” is Unconstitutional, 15 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. 
L. 169, 200–02 (2007) (The “Lone Wolf” Amendment expanded the definition of 
agent of a foreign power, and the USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization 
Act of 2005 extended the duration of surveillance.). 
9 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(a) (2012). 
10 See infra Part II for the discussion of different scholars’ thoughts on FISA 
changes. 
11 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1142 (2013). 
12 Id. at 1155. 
13 See infra Part II. 
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believed that they had standing.14  Part IV will examine lower court 
decisions, specifically focusing on Article III standing.15  Part V will 
examine how the U.S. Supreme Court came to its decision that 
Respondents did not satisfy the imminent injury element and thus did 
not have standing.16  This part will also examine Justice Breyer’s 
dissent, how he criticizes the Court’s analysis of imminent injury, 
and why he believes Respondents’ injury is not too speculative.17  
Part VI will analyze the impact of the ruling in Clapper.18  Who has 
standing to bring a claim against FISA?  Is the ruling of the Court 
strengthening FISA?  This part will discuss opinions of scholars on 
whether the amendments to FISA are obliterating its original purpose 
to stop the government from abusing electronic surveillance in the 
name of national security.19  Part VI will also discuss the impact of 
these changes to the Act on the balance between national security and 
individuals’ privacy.20  Part VII concludes that the purpose of FISA 
(keeping the balance between national security and individuals’ 
privacy) has been frustrated by numerous amendments to FISA, 
especially within the past decade.21 
 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
In 1978, Congress passed FISA as a response to the Court’s 
decision in United States v. United States District Court, commonly 
called Keith.22  In Keith, the United States charged three defendants 
                                                            
14 See infra Part III. 
15 See infra Part IV. 
16 See infra Part V.A. 
17 See infra Part V.B. 
18 See infra Part VI. 
19 See infra Part VI. 
20 See infra Part VI. 
21 See infra Part VII. 
22 United States v. U.S. District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 299 (1972).  “The 
title ‘Keith’ is taken from the name of then-United States District Court Judge 
Damon Keith.”  Tracey Maclin, The Bush Administration’s Terrorist Surveillance 
Program and the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Requirement: Lessons from Justice 
Powell and the Keith Case, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV 1259, 1263 n.9 (2008).  Judge 
Keith disagreed with the Government’s claim that the President has the inherent 
authority to authorize warrantless wiretaps for national security purposes and 
ordered the Government to disclose electronic surveillance directed at the 
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with conspiracy to destroy government property.23  During pretrial 
proceedings, the defendants filed a motion to compel the United 
States to disclose electronic surveillance information.24  In response 
to the motion, the Government filed an affidavit by the Attorney 
General.25  The affidavit stated, “[T]he Attorney General approved 
the wiretaps ‘to gather intelligence information deemed necessary to 
protect the nation from attempts of domestic organizations to attack 
and subvert the existing structure of the Government.’”26  The 
Government argued that even though the surveillance was conducted 
without prior judicial approval, it was still lawful because it was a 
“reasonable exercise of the President’s power . . . to protect the 
national security.”27  The District Court for the Eastern District of 
Michigan disagreed with the Government and held that the 
surveillance violated the Fourth Amendment.28  In deciding that the 
surveillance was unlawful, the Supreme Court of the United States 
emphasized that the issue in Keith was “only the domestic aspects of 
                                                            
defendants.  Id.  (reviewing United States v. Sinclair, 321 F. Supp. 1074 (E.D. 
Mich. 1971)).  “The government then filed a writ of mandamus in the Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit to compel Judge Keith to vacate his order . . . .”  Id. 
23 Keith, 407 U.S. at 299. 
24 Id. at 299–300. 
25 Id. at 300. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 301 (The President’s power was exercised through the Attorney 
General.).  Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 
created two exceptions to the juridical approval: as to foreign threats, “[n]othing 
contained in this chapter . . . shall limit the constitutional power of the President [1] 
to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the Nation against actual or 
potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power, [2] to obtain foreign 
intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States, or [3] 
to protect national security information against foreign intelligence activities” and 
as to domestic threats, “[n]or shall anything contained in this chapter be deemed to 
limit the constitutional power of the President to take such measures as he deems 
necessary to protect the United States [4] against the overthrow of the Government 
by force or other unlawful means, or [5] against any other clear and present danger 
to the structure or existence of the Government.”  Seamon & Gardner, supra note 
2, at 330–31. 
28 United States v. Sinclair, 321 F. Supp. 1074 (E.D. Mich. 1971), aff’d, rev’d 
sub nom. United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for E.D. of Mich., 444 F.2d 651 (6th Cir. 
1971), cert. granted, 403 U.S. 297 (1972). 
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national security” and not “activities of foreign powers or their 
agents.”29   
Because the ruling in Keith only applied to domestic national 
security, the President still had power to authorize electronic 
surveillance against foreign powers to protect the nation.30  Congress 
perceived that the surveillance power was being abused and needed 
to be controlled.31  After the ruling in Keith, Congress passed FISA to 
address abusive uses of electronic surveillance.32  A committee 
established by Congress to investigate abusive use of electronic 
surveillance discovered that “at least since the administration of 
Franklin Roosevelt in 1940,” many presidents authorized electronic 
surveillance “for national security purposes” without judicial 
approval.33  The committee reported the following numbers: 
 
• Nearly a quarter of a million first class letters were 
opened and photographed in the United States by 
the CIA between 1953–1973, producing a CIA 
computerized index of nearly one and one-half 
million names. 
• At least 130,000 first class letters were opened and 
photographed by the FBI between 1940–1966 in 
eight U.S. cities. 
• Some 300,000 individuals were indexed in a CIA 
computer system and separate files were created 
on approximately 7,200 Americans and over 100 
domestic groups during the course of CIA’s 
Operation CHAOS (1967–1973). 
• Millions of private telegrams sent from, to, or 
through the United States were obtained by the 
National Security Agency from 1947 to 1975 
                                                            
29 Keith, 407 U.S. at 321–24; see also Seamon & Gardner, supra note 2, at 
330–32.  
30 Blum, supra note 7, at 274. 
31 Id. at 287. 
32 Id. at 275; Seamon & Gardner, supra note 2, at 334–37. 
33 For a more detailed list of the committee’s report, see Blum, supra note 7, at 
275; see also Banks, supra note 1, at 1226–27. 
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under a secret arrangement with three United 
States telegraph companies. 
• An estimated 100,000 Americans were the 
subjects of United States Army intelligence files 
created between the mid-[1960s] and 1971. 
• Intelligence files on more than 11,000 individuals 
and groups were created by the Internal Revenue 
Services between 1969 and 1973 and tax 
investigations were started on the basis of political 
rather than tax criteria. 
• At least 26,000 individuals were at one point 
catalogued on an FBI list of persons to be rounded 
up in the event of a “national emergency.”34 
 
Electronic surveillance was also used for political purposes.  
Presidents Johnson and Nixon used electronic surveillance for 
political purposes, such as eavesdropping on United States citizens 
who opposed Vietnam War protesters.35  In the 1970s, President 
Nixon refused to disclose tape recordings of his political opponents 
for national security purposes.36  In light of these activities, Congress 
believed it was necessary to set boundaries on presidential discretion 
by passing FISA.  
 
A. FISA 
 
In 1978, Congress passed FISA, which allowed for electronic 
surveillance of foreign powers or an agent of a foreign power—as 
specially defined in section 1801 of the FISA.37  According to FISA, 
a foreign power is: 
 
                                                            
34 Senate Select Comm. To Study Governmental Operations, Intelligence 
Activities and the Rights of Americans, S. REP. No. 94-755, at 6–7 (1976), 
reviewed by Banks, supra note 1, at 1226–27. 
35 Blum, supra note 7, at 275; Nicholas J. Whilt, The Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act: Protecting the Civil Liberties that Make Defense of Our Nation 
Worthwhile, 35 SW. U. L. REV. 361, 385 (2006). 
36 Banks, supra note 1, at 1225. 
37 Allan N. Kornblum & Lubomyr M. Jachnycky, America’s Secret Court: 
Listening in on Espionage and Terrorism, 24 JUDGES’ J. 15, 15 (1985).   
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(1) a foreign government or any component thereof, 
whether or not recognized by the United States; 
(2) a faction of a foreign nation or nations, not 
substantially composed of United States persons; 
(3) an entity that is openly acknowledged by a foreign 
government or governments to be directed and 
controlled by such foreign government or 
governments; 
(4) a group engaged in international terrorism or 
activities in preparation therefor; 
(5) a foreign-based political organization, not 
substantially composed of United States persons;  
(6) an entity that is directed and controlled by a 
foreign government or governments; or 
(7) an entity not substantially composed of United 
States persons that is engaged in the international 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.38   
 
An agent of a foreign power means any person other than a 
United States person who: 
 
(A) acts in the United States as an officer or employee 
of a foreign power, or as a member of a foreign power 
as defined in subsection (a)(4) of this section; 
(B) acts for or on behalf of a foreign power which 
engages in clandestine intelligence activities in the 
United States contrary to the interests of the United 
States, when the circumstances of such person’s 
presence in the United States indicate that such person 
may engage in such activities in the United States, or 
when such person knowingly aids or abets any person 
in the conduct of such activities or knowingly 
conspires with any person to engage in such activities; 
(C) engages in international terrorism or activities in 
preparation therefore; 
                                                            
38 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(1)–(7) (2012). 
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(D) engages in the international proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, or activities in 
preparation therefor; or 
(E) engages in the international proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, or activities in 
preparation therefor for or on behalf of a foreign 
power39 
 
FISA also defined electronic surveillance to include using an 
electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device to acquire any 
wire or radio communication.40  FISA established two courts to 
                                                            
39 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(1)(A)–(E) (2012). 
40 Amnesty Int’l USA v. McConnell, 646 F. Supp. 2d 633, 643 (S.D. N.Y. 
2009), vacated, rev’d sub nom. Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118 (2d 
Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013). 
FISA defined electronic surveillance to include: (1) the 
acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance 
device of the contents of any wire or radio communication sent 
by or intended to be received by a particular, known United 
States person who is in the United States, if the contents are 
acquired by intentionally targeting that United States person, 
under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law 
enforcement purposes; (2) the acquisition by an electronic, 
mechanical, or other surveillance device of the contents of any 
wire communication to or from a person in the United States, 
without the consent of any party thereto, if such acquisition 
occurs in the United States, but does not include the acquisition 
of those communications of computer trespassers that would be 
permissible under section 2511(2)(i) of Title 18; (3) the 
intentional acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other 
surveillance device of the contents of any radio communication, 
under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law 
enforcement purposes, and if both the sender and all intended 
recipients are located within the United States; or (4) the 
installation or use of an electronic, mechanical, or other 
surveillance device in the United States for monitoring to acquire 
information, other than from a wire or radio communication, 
under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law 
enforcement purposes.   
Id. at 122 n.2. 
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govern applications for orders authorizing electronic surveillance: the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISA Court) and the Court 
of Review (FISA Review Court).41  The FISA Court consisted of 
seven district court judges appointed by the Chief Justice of the 
United States Supreme Court, and the FISA Review Court consisted 
of three district court or appellate court judges appointed by the Chief 
Justice.42  The FISA Court has jurisdiction to review applications for 
authorizing electronic surveillance, and the FISA Review Court has 
jurisdiction to review applications that have been denied by the FISA 
Court.43  A federal officer submits a written application to the FISA 
Court, which includes identity, if known, or a description of the 
specific target, a statement justifying his belief that “the target of the 
electronic surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign 
power,” and a description of the facilities at which the electronic 
surveillance is directed, among other things.44  Because the FISA 
Court proceedings are held privately, it is difficult to assess the 
effectiveness of the court.45   
 
B. USA PATRIOT Act 
 
 In 2001, roughly five weeks after the September 11th attacks, 
Congress passed the Uniting and Strengthening America by 
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act), which amended several 
provisions of FISA.46  The USA PATRIOT Act increased the number 
of hours the government can conduct emergency warrantless 
surveillance from twenty-four hours to seventy-two hours, expanded 
the number of FISA Court judges from seven to eleven, “expanded 
the availability of physical searches, pen registers, and trap and trace 
                                                            
41 Davis, supra note 8, at 192; Kornblum & Jachnycky, supra note 37, at 16. 
42 Davis, supra note 8, at 192. 
43 Id. 
44 50 U.S.C § 1804(a)(3)(A) (2012). 
45 Nola K. Breglio, Leaving FISA Behind: The Need to Return to Warrantless 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance, 113 YALE L.J. 179, 188 (2003).  FISA Court 
itself is also very secretive.  Id. at 190.  FISA Court is not listed in The United 
States Government Manual or in The United States Court Directory, and the 
location of the court was initially kept secret.  Id. 
46 Hund, supra note 8, at 191. 
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devices, . . . allowed roving wiretaps[, and] . . . extended the time 
periods for the surveillance from 90 days to 120 days.”47  But most 
importantly, the USA PATRIOT Act lowered the legal standard for a 
FISA warrant from a “primary purpose” to a “significant purpose.”48  
To obtain a warrant for surveillance, the government has to assert 
that the purpose of the surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence 
information, which, over time, has been interpreted as the “primary 
purpose.”49  The primary purpose test is very important because it 
distinguishes between “the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence 
and the purpose of gathering evidence for a prosecution.”50  
Information obtained under FISA may be used as evidence in 
criminal prosecutions as long as the primary purpose of surveillance 
under FISA was to gather foreign intelligence.51  The test draws a 
line between foreign intelligence and criminal prosecution at the 
outset of surveillance.52  The USA PATRIOT Act, however, lowered 
the standard to a “significant purpose.”53  During the floor debate for 
the USA PATRIOT Act, Senator Dianne Feinstein stated that 
changing the requirement from “the [primary] purpose” to a 
                                                            
47 Blum, supra note 7, at 280. 
48 Id. 
49 Id.  Before FISA was passed, some courts of appeals upheld warrantless 
electronic surveillances that were conducted “for the sole or primary purpose of 
obtaining foreign intelligence information.”  Seamon & Gardner, supra note 2, at 
359.  See, e.g., United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 605 (3d Cir. 1974) (en 
banc) (holding that the warrantless wiretaps were constitutional because they were 
conducted solely for the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence information); see 
also United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 427 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding that the 
warrantless wiretaps were constitutional because they were conducted for the 
purpose of gathering foreign intelligence).  But see United States v. Truong, 629 
F.2d 908, 911 (4th Cir. 1980) (holding that warrantless electronic surveillances 
were unconstitutional to the extent the government switched the focus of 
investigation for criminal prosecution).  After the passage of FISA, courts applied 
the primary purpose test to surveillance authorized under FISA.  Seamon & 
Gardner, supra note 2, at 364.  See, e.g., United States v. Megahey, 553 F. Supp. 
1180 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59 (2d 
Cir. 1984) (upheld Defendant’s conviction because the government’s primary 
purpose for the surveillance was to obtain foreign intelligence). 
50 Seamon & Gardner, supra note 2, at 365. 
51 Id. at 366. 
52 See id. at 367. 
53 Blum, supra note 7, at 281.   
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“significant purpose” was to make it “easier to collect foreign 
intelligence information.54  Senator Feinstein explained: 
 
[I]n today’s world things are not so simple.  In many 
cases, surveillance will have two key goals—the 
gathering of foreign intelligence, and the gathering of 
evidence for a criminal prosecution. . . . 
 
Rather than forcing law enforcement to decide which 
purpose is primary . . . this bill strikes a new balance.  
It will now require that a “significant” purpose of the 
investigation must be foreign intelligence gathering to 
proceed with surveillance under FISA. 
 
The effect of this provision will be to make it easier 
for law enforcement to . . . [use FISA] . . . where the 
subject of the surveillance is both a potential source of 
valuable intelligence and the potential target of a 
criminal prosecution.55  
 
The government’s electronic surveillance was conducted under 
FISA (as amended by the USA PATRIOT Act) until 2008,56 with 
small changes.57 
During the period between the USA PATRIOT Act and the 2008 
Amendments to FISA, the Bush administration created the Terrorist 
Surveillance Program (TSP), which authorized the National Security 
Agency (NSA) “to engage in electronic surveillance, without prior 
judicial authorization, of communications between persons in other 
                                                            
54 Banks, supra note 1, at 1245.  
55 147 CONG. REC. S10,990, S11,004 (2001) (statement of Sen. Feinstein), 
quoted in Banks, supra note 1, at 1245. 
56 Blum, supra note 7, at 283. 
57 Hund, supra note 8, at 200.  In 2004, Congress passed the “Lone Wolf” 
Amendment, which expanded the definition of agent of a foreign power.  Id. at 200.  
The Lone Wolf Amendment does not require the government to prove a connection 
with a foreign power when seeking surveillance authorization for nonresident 
aliens.  Id. at n.176.   
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countries and persons inside the United States.”58  The Bush 
administration directed the NSA to intercept electronic 
communications that started or ended in the United States59 if the 
government had “a reasonable basis to believe [the communication] 
involve[d] al Qaeda or . . . its affiliates.”60  Although the TSP was 
created shortly after the September 11th attacks, it was kept secret 
until the New York Times disclosed its existence in 2005.61  
Conducting wiretaps outside the United States does not require a 
warrant, but the Bush administration directed the NSA to intercept 
electronic communications that started and ended in the United 
States.62  This required the NSA to obtain a FISA warrant, yet the 
TSP did not fall under the framework of FISA.63  Some critics argued 
that the TSP violated the Fourth Amendment and FISA, while the 
Bush administration argued that the TSP was legal under Article II of 
the Constitution.64  In 2007, however, “the government announced 
that President Bush would not reauthorize the TSP because the 
government had succeeded in obtaining an order under FISA 
                                                            
58 Michael Avery, The Constitutionality of Warrantless Electronic Surveillance 
of Suspected Foreign Threats to the National Security of the United States, 62 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 541, 541 (2008).  
59 Blum, supra note 7, at 283. 
60 Avery, supra note 58, at 544–45.   
NSA also targeted the communications of individuals it deemed 
suspicious on the basis of NSA’s belief that the targeted 
individuals had some unspecified “link” to al Qaeda or 
unspecified related terrorist organizations, that they belonged to 
an organization that the government considers to be “affiliated” 
with al Qaeda, that they had provided some unspecified support 
for al Qaeda, or that they “want to kill Americans.”  
Id. 
61 Blum, supra note 7, at 284.  The New York Times published an article in 
2005 revealing TSP and what NSA was authorized to do under TSP.  James Risen 
& Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
16, 2005, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/16program.html?pagewanted=all. 
62 Blum, supra note 7, at 283. 
63 Id.  
64 Critics viewed FISA as “the exclusive statute monitoring foreign 
surveillance” and the Bush administration viewed the TSP as the President 
exercising his inherent authority as Commander in Chief.  Id. at 284. 
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allowing similar surveillance to be conducted under the Act.”65  In 
2007, the FISA Court issued orders authorizing the government to 
conduct surveillance on international communications that start or 
end in the United States if there is “probable cause to believe that one 
participant to the communication was a member or agent of al Qaeda 
or an associated terrorist organization.”66  These new orders 
subjected NSA’s current electronic surveillances to the FISA Court’s 
approval.67  After the FISA Court narrowed its authorization, the 
President asked Congress to amend FISA in order to provide 
intelligence agencies “additional authority to meet the challenges of 
modern technology and international terrorism.”68  Responding to the 
President’s request, Congress passed the Protect America Act in 
2007.69  Though it expired after six months, it set the stage for the 
FISA Amendments Act in 2008.70  A few months after the Protect 
America Act expired, Congress passed the FISA Amendments Act.71  
Former Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Office of Legal 
Counsel, John Yoo, argued that the probable cause element72 of FISA 
causes several problems.73  He explained the problem as follows: 
when an al Qaeda leader has a cell phone with a hundred numbers in 
its memory and ten of them are in the United States, the government 
would need to obtain a warrant to conduct surveillance.74  However, 
Yoo argued that the users of those ten numbers would probably not 
fall under the category of agents of a foreign power under FISA 
because the FISA Court would “probably require” evidence 
identifying people who answered the phone, which the intelligence 
                                                            
65 Avery, supra note 58, at 582. 
66 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1144 (2013). 
67 Id. 
68 Id.  “FISA also must keep pace with the continuing explosion in 
communications technologies available both to law enforcement agencies and 
potential surveillance targets.”  Yoo, supra note 5, at n.82. 
69 Owen Fiss, Even in a Time of Terror, 31 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 9 (2012). 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 FISA requires the government to show that they have a probable cause to 
believe that someone is an agent of a foreign power when obtaining a warrant from 
FISA Court.  50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3) (2010). 
73 Yoo, supra note 5, at 575.   
74 Id. at 575–76. 
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agencies would not know immediately.75  He further argued that in 
the case of e-mail addresses, it is even more difficult to establish 
probable cause because it is not immediately obvious who holds 
which email address.76  However, despite Yoo’s argument, the 
statistics showed that most of the applications seeking a surveillance 
warrant were granted.77   
 
C. FISA Amendments Act of 2008 
 
In 2008, Congress passed an amendment to FISA.78  Under the 
FISA Amendments Act, “the Attorney General and the Director of 
National Intelligence may authorize jointly, for a period of up to 
[one] year from the effective date of the authorization, the targeting 
of persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States 
to acquire foreign intelligence information.”79  There are several 
limitations when carrying out the surveillance authorized under the 
new amendment.80  The government: 
 
(1) may not intentionally target any person known at 
the time of acquisition to be located in the United 
States; 
(2) may not intentionally target a person reasonably 
believed to be located outside the United States if the 
purpose of such acquisition is to target a particular, 
known person reasonably believed to be in the United 
States; 
(3) may not intentionally target a United States person 
reasonably believed to be located outside the United 
States; 
(4) may not intentionally acquire any communication 
as to which the sender and all intended recipients are 
                                                            
75 Id. 
76 Id.  
77 See infra note 188 for the statistics of FISA Court granting surveillance 
warrants.  
78 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2012). 
79 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(a) (2012). 
80 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b)(1)-(5) (2012). 
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known at the time of the acquisition to be located in 
the United States; and 
(5) shall be conducted in a manner consistent with the 
fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States.81 
 
Unlike FISA, the FISA Amendments Act protects all Americans 
by adding section 1881a(b) limitations.82  On the other hand, the new 
amendment changed a handful of provisions, loosening warrant 
procedures.83  Under the FISA Amendments Act, the Attorney 
General does not need to identify the specific place at which the 
surveillance will be conducted.84  The FISA Court no longer looks at 
individual surveillance applications, but instead looks to see if the 
government followed procedural requirements under FISA.85  The 
FISA Amendments Act also increases the exigent circumstance 
exception to seven days.86  As long as the government presents 
certification to the FISA Court within seven days, the government 
can begin surveillance under an exigent circumstance.87  When there 
is no exigent circumstance, the Attorney General and the Director of 
National Intelligence must submit a certification to the FISA Court, 
and the court must review the certification, targeting procedures, and 
minimization procedures.88  If the FISA Court finds that the 
                                                            
81 Id.  
82 Under FISA, there was no specific procedure for obtaining a warrant for 
conducting surveillance on Americans outside the United States.  Jonathan D. 
Forgang, “The Right of the People”: The FISA Amendments Act of 2008, and 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance of Americans Overseas, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 
217, 238 (2009). 
83 Id. at 238. 
84 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(g)(4) (2012). 
85 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(2) (2012).  Under FISA Amendments Act, the 
government does not need to disclose every targeted individual to the FISA Court.  
Fiss, supra note 69, at 18.  This allows the FISA Court to issue “blanket” 
authorization, allowing the government to target a large group of people.  Id.  
86 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(g)(1)(B) (2012).  Attorney General and the Director of 
National Intelligence determine that exigent circumstances exist when there is not 
enough time to obtain authorization.  See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(c)(2) (2012). 
87 Id. 
88 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(2) (2012). 
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government satisfied the statute, it will approve the procedures for 
conducting surveillance.89  
1. Certification 
 
The Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence 
are required to provide a written certificate to the FISA Court.90  A 
certification must attest that there are procedures to ensure that 
targeted persons are reasonably believed to be located outside the 
United States and to prevent the intentional acquisition of 
communications where participants are known to be located in the 
United States.91  It must also attest that the minimization procedures 
meet the definition of minimization procedures under section 1801(h) 
or section 1821(4).92  There is an exception to this rule.  The FISA 
Amendments Act gives the Attorney General and the Director of 
National Intelligence seven days to submit a certification to the FISA 
Court if time did not permit them to submit a certification prior to 
implementing an authorization of surveillance.93 
2. Targeting Procedures 
 
The Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence 
are required to adopt targeting procedures to ensure that targeted 
persons under the authorization are limited to “persons reasonably 
believed to be located outside the United States” and to prevent the 
intentional acquisition of any communications between people who 
were known to be located in the United States at the time of the 
acquisition.94  The procedure must also prevent the government from 
intentionally targeting persons reasonably believed to be located 
outside the United States if the purpose of acquiring the 
                                                            
89 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3) (2012). 
90 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(g)(1)(A) (2012). 
91 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(g)(2)(A)(i) (2012). 
92 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(g)(2)(A)(ii) (2012). 
93 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(g)(1)(B) (2012).  When FISA was first established, the 
government had twenty-four hours to obtain a warrant in cases of emergency 
surveillance.  Pub.L. No. 95-511, § 105(e), 92 Stat. 1792 (1978).  The USA 
PATRIOT Act increased this to seventy-two hours.  Blum, supra note 7, at 280. 
94 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(d) (2012). 
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communication is to target a particular, known person reasonably 
believed to be in the United States.95   
3. Minimization Procedures 
 
The Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence 
are required to adopt minimization procedures as defined under 
sections 1801(h)(1) and 1821(4)(A) of FISA.96  Minimization 
procedures are “specific procedures . . . that are reasonably designed . 
. . to minimize the acquisition and retention, and prohibit the 
dissemination, of nonpublicly available information concerning 
unconsenting United States persons consistent with the need of the 
United States to obtain, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence 
information.”97  The minimization procedures ensure that 
nonpublicly available information about any United States person 
that is not foreign intelligence information will not be disseminated 
without such person’s consent.  However, when the information is 
evidence of a crime, the statute allows the government to retain and 
disseminate such information for law enforcement purposes.98 
 If the FISA Court finds that one of the three requirements failed 
to satisfy the statute, the court will order the government to correct 
any deficiencies within thirty days or not to implement the 
authorization submitted for approval.99  The government has the 
option to appeal the FISA Court’s decision to the FISA Review 
Court.100  If the government has already begun implementing the 
authorization before submitting a certification to the FISA Court, the 
government may continue acquiring surveillance while the case is 
pending for rehearing or until the FISA Review Court enters an 
order.101 
 
 
                                                            
95 Id.  
96 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(e)(1) (2012). 
97 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h)(1) (2012); 50 U.S.C. § 1821(4)(A) (2012). 
98 50 U.S.C. § 1821(4)(C) (2012). 
99 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3)(B) (2012). 
100 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(4) (2012). 
101 Id. 
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D. Fourth Amendment 
 
Respondents in Clapper argued that the FISA Amendments Act 
violates the Fourth Amendment because it “fails to protect the 
privacy interest of Americans in the content of their telephone calls 
and emails.”102  The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution protects 
people from unreasonable searches and seizures.103  When FISA was 
passed, however, Congress did not require the Fourth Amendment’s 
traditional probable cause standard.104  The government could use 
information gathered under FISA in criminal investigations, as FISA 
“simply requires probable cause to believe that the target of the 
electronic surveillance is a foreign agent and the targeted facility is, 
or is about to be, used by a foreign agent.”105  If the target is a United 
States person, the government needs to show that the target is “an 
employee or agent of a foreign power,” and if the foreign power is a 
terrorist group, “it can be fairly assumed that . . . the target is a 
terrorist and thus that the probable case requirement has been 
satisfied.”106  Taking it one step further, surveillance under FISA is 
allowed, “even if the foreign power is another nation . . . and there is 
thus no reason to suspect the target of criminal activity.”107  To 
maintain the balance between national security and our Constitutional 
protection, FISA’s lowered probable cause standard only applied to 
surveillances where the purpose was to gather foreign intelligence.108  
Many scholars have criticized the change in wording from “primary 
purpose” to “significant purpose” for the probable cause standard109 
in the USA PATRIOT Act because they viewed this change to mean 
that United States citizens are more exposed to electronic 
                                                            
102 Amnesty Int’l USA v. McConnell, 646 F. Supp. 2d 633, 642 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009), vacated, rev’d sub nom. Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118 (2d 
Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013). 
103 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
104 Hardin, supra note 4, at 292. 
105 Id.  
106 Fiss, supra note 69, at 21.   
107 Id. 
108 Hardin, supra note 4, at 292. 
109 Blum, supra note 7, at 282. 
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surveillance of their international communications.110  Law professor 
Stephen Schulhofer at New York University argued that this change 
exposed “U[nited] S[tates] citizens and foreign nationals . . . to 
‘broad FISA surveillance’ when the government’s primary purpose is 
not to gather foreign intelligence but instead to gather evidence for 
use at a criminal trial.”111  This change allowed the government to 
conduct electronic surveillance authorized under FISA for the 
purposes of finding evidence in criminal prosecutions.112  Against 
these critics, the FISA Review Court upheld the change in In re 
Sealed Case, arguing that the government’s primary purpose is to 
stop terrorism, and that criminal prosecutions are often “interrelated 
with other techniques used to frustrate a foreign power’s efforts.”113  
The FISA Review Court further argued that “unless the government’s 
‘sole objective’ was to obtain evidence of a past crime, a FISA 
warrant should be granted.”114  In its discussion of the Fourth 
Amendment, the FISA Review Court distinguished the criminal 
prosecution from foreign intelligence as applied to ordinary crimes, 
thereby holding that the USA PATRIOT Act is constitutional.115  
Hardin criticized this holding because he believed the FISA Review 
Court failed to consider the constitutionality of the USA PATRIOT 
Act in relation to ordinary crimes.116  Instead, Hardin opined that by 
broadening “the applicability of FISA to ordinary crimes inextricably 
intertwined with foreign intelligence activity,” the USA PATRIOT 
Act went beyond what the Fourth Amendment allows.117 
                                                            
110 Banks, supra note 1, at 1213.  See Part II.B for the discussion regarding 
how the court interpreted “purpose” as “primary purpose.” 
111 STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, THE ENEMY WITHIN INTELLIGENCE GATHERING, 
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE WAKE OF SEPTEMBER 11 44 
(Century Foundation Press, 2002), construed in Blum, supra note 7, at 281–82. 
112 Banks, supra note 1, at 1213. 
113 In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 743 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002). 
114 Blum, supra note 7, at 282. 
115 In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 743 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002), construed in 
Hardin, supra note 4, at 333. 
116 Id.  Hardin foresaw a situation in which “authorities conducting a FISA 
surveillance . . . conceivably put greater emphasis on collecting evidence regarding 
a murder investigation in which the counterintelligence information is 
insignificant.”  Id. at 333–34.   
117 Id. at 345. 
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The FISA Amendments Act made an effort to ensure that the 
Fourth Amendment would be protected.  Section 1881a(b)(5) states 
that an authorized acquisition of foreign intelligence information 
“shall be conducted in a manner consistent with the [F]ourth 
[A]mendment to the Constitution of the United States.”118  However, 
“it is unclear what this additional requirement will add” to 
conducting electronic surveillance overseas,119 because if the target is 
a foreigner not in the United States, the government does not have to 
prove that the target is associated with a foreign power; the 
government need only prove that the target is a foreigner abroad.120  
Also, the FISA Amendments Act kept the “significant purpose” 
standard from the USA PATRIOT Act.121   
Once the FISA Amendments Act was passed, Respondents filed 
suit against the government seeking a declaration that the Act is 
unconstitutional and an injunction against surveillance authorized 
under the Act.122   
 
III. FACTS OF CLAPPER V. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA 
Respondents were attorneys, human rights, labor, legal, and 
media organizations “whose work require[d] them to engage in 
sensitive and sometimes privileged telephone and e-mail 
communications” with persons not in the United States.123  Many of 
                                                            
118 50 U.S.C § 1881a(b)(5) (2012). 
119 Blum, supra note 7, at 298. 
120 Fiss, supra note 69, at 21. 
121 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(g)(2)(A)(v) (2012). 
122 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2012).   
123 Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 14, Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l 
USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2012) (No. 11-1025).   
Some [respondents] communicate by telephone and email with 
people located in geographic areas that are a special focus of the 
U.S. government’s counterterrorism or diplomatic efforts . . . 
some [respondents] communicate with attorneys or co-counsel 
overseas . . . some [respondents] communicate . . . with the 
family members of individuals who have been detained by the 
U.S. military or CIA . . . some [respondents] communicate . . . 
with political dissidents and human rights activists abroad . . . 
[and] some [respondents] communicate by telephone and email 
with foreign journalists, researchers, and other experts overseas.   
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these people were located in areas that were a special focus of the 
U.S. government.124  Sylvia Royce and Scott McKay were attorneys 
whose clients were accused terrorists and Guantanamo Bay 
detainees.125  They regularly communicated with their clients and 
their clients’ families, who were abroad.126  Because their clients 
were alleged to have been involved in terrorism, the nature of the 
conversations often related to terrorism, national defense, or foreign 
affairs.127  Joanne Mariner was a human rights researcher who 
tracked down people the CIA rendered to other countries.128  The 
nature of her job required her to frequently communicate with 
detainees, political activists, journalists, and fixers from all over the 
world; the CIA stamped many of these people as being involved in 
terrorist organizations.129  When Congress passed the FISA 
Amendments Act, Respondents brought an action seeking a 
declaration that the new amendment was unconstitutional and an 
injunction seeking to enjoin any foreign intelligence surveillance 
from being conducted under the amendment.130  Respondents alleged 
that the new amendment compromised their ability to engage in 
confidential communications via telephone and e-mail due to who the 
Respondents communicated with.131  The United States government 
was likely to target some of the people Respondents communicated 
with because they were people the United States government 
believed were associated with terrorist organizations and are located 
in areas that were a “special focus” of the United States 
government.132  Respondents also alleged that they were compelled 
“to take costly and burdensome measures to protect the privacy of 
their communications.”133  Respondents had to assume that the 
                                                            
Brief for Respondents at 16–17, Clapper, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (No. 11–1025). 
124 Brief for the Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 123, at 14. 
125 Brief for Respondents, supra note 123, at 16. 
126 Id. at 15–16. 
127 Brief for Comm. on Civil Rights of the Ass’n of the Bar of N.Y.C. at 3, 
Clapper, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (No. 11-1025). 
128 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1158. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 1138. 
131 Id.  
132 Brief for the Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 123, at 15–17. 
133 Id. at 17, 19. 
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government may monitor every international communication; 
therefore, Respondents had to either forego the communication or 
travel abroad to have an in-person conversation.134 
 
IV. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
To establish Article III standing, Plaintiffs had to show: (1) they 
suffered an actual and imminent injury that was concrete and 
particularized, (2) there was a causal connection between the injury 
and the Defendant’s actions, and (3) it was likely that a favorable 
decision in the case would redress the injury.135   
 
A. United States District Court for the Southern District of New 
York 
 
The District Court for the Southern District of New York held 
that Plaintiffs lacked standing to bring a pre-enforcement challenge 
against the FISA Amendments Act.  Plaintiffs argued that they only 
needed to demonstrate “an actual and well-founded fear that the law 
[would] be enforced against” them to satisfy the actual and imminent 
injury requirement because they were bringing a pre-enforcement 
challenge to a statute on First Amendment grounds.136  The District 
Court responded that “[t]he plaintiffs [could] only demonstrate an 
abstract fear that their communications [would] be monitored.”137  
The District Court stated that the FISA Amendments Act does not 
authorize the automatic surveillance of persons such as Plaintiffs; it 
requires the government to seek authorization from the FISA Court.  
The District Court referred to United Presbyterian Church in the 
United States of America v. Reagan and stated that the courts have 
rejected standing based on a fear of surveillance, similar to the fear of 
surveillance in this case.138  The District Court concluded that the 
                                                            
134 Brief for Respondents, supra note 123, at 20. 
135 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
136 Amnesty Int’l USA v. McConnell, 646 F. Supp. 2d 633, 644 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009), vacated, rev’d sub nom. Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118 (2d 
Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013). 
137 Id. at 645. 
138 Id.  Plaintiffs in United Presbyterian Church in the United States of 
America v. Reagan, 738 F.2d 1375 (D.C. Cir. 1984), challenged the 
    
Fall 2014 Balancing National Security and Individuals’ Privacy 467 
link between Plaintiffs’ fear of injury and the FISA Amendments Act 
was attenuated because the statute created a judicial body (FISA 
Court) to review each application for surveillance in order to ensure 
that it complied with the Fourth Amendment.139 
The District Court also rejected Plaintiffs’ second argument—that 
Plaintiffs had to take costly and burdensome measures to ensure 
confidential communication with people outside of the United 
States.140  The District Court held that this argument could not be 
linked to the FISA Amendments Act because that action resulted 
from their fear of surveillance.141  Plaintiffs’ incurred costs could not 
be the basis for standing because they were not independent of their 
first actual and imminent injury argument.142   
 
B. United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
 
The Second Circuit vacated the District Court’s decision and held 
that the Plaintiffs had standing.143  The Second Circuit interpreted the 
elements of standing differently than the District Court.144  As to the 
actual and imminent injury element, the Second Circuit reasoned that 
“[w]hen a plaintiff asserts a present injury based on conduct taken in 
anticipation of future government action, [the court] evaluate[s] the 
likelihood that the future action will in fact come to pass.”145  As to 
the traceability element, the Second Circuit considered whether the 
Plaintiffs’ present injury “resulted from some irrational or otherwise 
clearly unreasonable fear of future government action that is unlikely 
                                                            
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 12333, which allows intelligence agencies 
to apply to the Attorney General for approval to collect, retain, or disseminate 
intelligence information.  The court in this case held that the plaintiffs lacked 
standing because they failed to show that “any specific action is threatened or even 
contemplated against them.”  Id. at 1380. 
139 McConnell, 646 F. Supp. 2d at 646. 
140 Id. at 653. 
141 Id.  
142 Id. at 658. 
143 Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. 
granted, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013). 
144 Id. at 131–132. 
145 Id. at 135 (emphasis omitted). 
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to take place.”146  The Second Circuit agreed with Plaintiffs that the 
government was likely to conduct surveillance on Plaintiffs’ 
communications in the future because Plaintiffs engaged in 
communications with individuals likely to be targeted by the 
government.147  The Second Circuit further held that fears of future 
surveillance were fairly traceable to the FISA Amendments Act 
because “they [we]re based on a reasonable interpretation of the 
challenged statute and a realistic understanding of the world.”148  
Unlike the District Court, the Second Circuit concluded that the FISA 
Court by itself did not preclude standing because virtually every 
application submitted to the FISA Court was approved.149  The 
Second Circuit held that Plaintiffs had standing because their fears of 
electronic surveillance and actions they took to avoid possible 
surveillance constituted actual and imminent injuries traceable to the 
FISA Amendments Act.150 
 
V. ANALYSIS OF OPINION 
In a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court held that Respondents did 
not have standing under Article III of the Constitution because they 
did not suffer any injury.151  The Court also held that the “costly and 
burdensome measures” Respondents had to take to protect their 
communications did not satisfy the injury requirement for 
standing.152  The minority disagreed and concluded that at least some 
of the respondents had standing because there was a high probability 
that the government—at some time in the future—would monitor at 
least some of Respondents’ communications.153 
                                                            
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 138.  These are people ‘the U.S. government believes or believed to 
be associated with terrorist organizations,’ ‘political and human rights activists who 
oppose governments that are supported economically or militarily by the U.S. 
government,’ and ‘people located in geographic areas that are a special focus of the 
U.S. government’s counterterrorism or diplomatic efforts.’”  Id. at 138–139.   
148 Id. at 139. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 140. 
151 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1155 (2013). 
152 Id. at 1143.  
153 Id. at 1155 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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A. Justice Alito’s Majority Opinion 
 
Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court in which Chief 
Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas 
joined.154  Justice Alito began his discussion by briefly explaining 
section 1881a and Respondents’ complaint, and stating the issue of 
this case—Article III standing.155  The Court held that Respondents 
lacked Article III standing because their “theory of future injury 
[was] too speculative” to satisfy the requirement that injury must be 
“certainly impending,” and even if they satisfied the “certainly 
impending” requirement, “they still would not be able to establish 
that . . . injury [was] fairly traceable to [section] 1881a.”156  The 
Court pointed out that Congress enacted FISA against the Court’s 
decision in United States v. United States District Court for Eastern 
District of Michigan.157  However, with the major changes, the FISA 
Amendments Act “established a new and independent source of 
intelligence collection authority, beyond that granted in traditional 
FISA.”158  The government seeking surveillance authorization is no 
longer required to (1) show probable cause that their target is a 
“foreign power or agent of a foreign power,” or (2) “specify the 
nature and location of each of the particular facilities or places” at 
which the surveillance will occur.159   
Justice Alito noted that Respondents asserted two theories of 
Article III standing, which he rejected later in the opinion.160  
Respondents claimed that “there [was] an objectively reasonable 
likelihood that their communications [would] be acquired under [the 
FISA Amendments Act] at some point in the future, thus causing 
them injury,” and that the risk of surveillance was “so substantial that 
                                                            
154 Id. 
155 Id. at 1142 (majority opinion).  
156 Id. at 1143. 
157 Id.  See United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for E.D. of Mich., S. Div. 92 S. Ct. 
2125 (1972).  This case “implicitly suggested that a special framework for foreign 
intelligence surveillance might be constitutionally permissible.”  Clapper, 133 S. 
Ct. at 1143.  
158 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1144. 
159 Id.  See supra Part II.C for FISA Amendments Act in detail. 
160 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1146.  See supra Part III.A–B for Justice Alito’s 
discussion regarding why Respondents’ two theories of Article III standing fail. 
    
470 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 34-2 
they [had] been forced to take costly and burdensome measures” to 
protect their international communications, thus causing present 
injury traceable to the FISA Amendments Act.161   
Starting with a brief history of Article III standing, Justice Alito 
began to lay out standards to meet Article III requirements.162  The 
issue in Clapper was whether Respondents satisfied the injury-in-fact 
element, and Justice Alito stated that threatened injury must have 
been certainly impending to satisfy the injury-in-fact element.163  The 
Court held that Respondents’ injury-in-fact argument failed because 
they relied on “a highly attenuated chain of possibilities,” which did 
not satisfy the certainly impending requirement.164  Justice Alito 
further noted that even if Respondents satisfied the injury-in-fact 
requirement, their argument failed to show that their injury could be 
fairly traceable to the FISA Amendments Act.165  Then Justice Alito 
provided reasons why Respondents’ speculative chain of possibilities 
failed to show that “injury based on potential future surveillance 
[was] certainly impending or [was] fairly traceable to [the FISA 
Amendments Act].”166  First, Justice Alito argued that Respondents 
assumed that the government may target their international 
communication without providing any factual evidence that their 
communications would be targeted.167  Second, even if Respondents 
could show that the government would imminently target their 
international communications, they could not satisfy the fairly 
traceable requirement because there were ways the government could 
conduct the surveillance other than under the FISA Amendments 
                                                            
161 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1146.  
162 Id. at 1146–47. 
163 Id. at 1147. 
164 Id. at 1147–48.  See also Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 500–
01 (2009) (rejecting a standing theory premised on a speculative chain of 
possibilities). 
165 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147–52; see also Am. Civ. Liberties Union v. Nat’l. 
Sec. Agency, 493 F.3d 644, 673–74 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that plaintiffs lacked 
standing to bring claim against the NSA’s use of warrantless wiretaps). 
166 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1150. 
167 Id. at 1149 (majority opinion).  But see id. at 1157–60 (Breyer, J. 
dissenting) (arguing that the injury-in-fact is not speculative). 
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Act.168  Third, even if the government had sought the FISA Court’s 
authorization, Respondents could only speculate as to whether the 
FISA Court would authorize the surveillance.169  Fourth, even if the 
government had obtained the FISA Court’s approval, it was unclear 
whether the government would successfully acquire the 
communications of Respondents’ foreign contacts.170  And lastly, 
even if the government had conducted surveillance of Respondents’ 
foreign contacts, Respondents could only speculate as to whether 
their own communications would be acquired.171   
Respondents also argued that they were suffering ongoing 
injuries because they were taking “costly and burdensome measures 
to protect the confidentiality of their communications” from the 
government.172  Noting the Second Circuit’s holding that 
Respondents’ ongoing injuries were fairly traceable to the FISA 
Amendments Act, the Court held that the Second Circuit analyzed 
the issue “under a relaxed reasonableness standard . . . improperly 
allow[ing] [R]espondents to establish standing.”173  Justice Alito 
argued that Respondents could not establish standing “merely by 
inflicting harm on themselves based on their fears of hypothetical 
future harm that [was] not certainly impending.”174  He feared that 
accepting fears of hypothetical further harm as satisfying the injury 
requirement would lower the standard for Article III standing.175  
Further supporting his argument that Respondents were inflicting 
harm on their own, Justice Alito pointed out that the ongoing injuries 
Respondents claimed to have suffered could not be fairly traceable to 
                                                            
168 Id. at 1149 (majority opinion).  See infra note 188 for FISA Court’s 
approval of authorization.  Justice Alito states that the Court is “reluctant to 
endorse standing theories that require guesswork as to how independent decision-
makers will exercise their judgment,” but looking at the statistics, the majority of 
the applications filed with the FISA Court has been approved.  Clapper, 133 S. Ct. 
at 1150. 
169 Id. at 1149–50. 
170 Id. at 1150.  
171 Id.  
172 Id. at 1151. 
173 Id.  The Second Circuit held that Respondents suffered present injuries in 
fact stemming from a reasonable fear of future harmful government conduct.  
Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 138 (2d Cir. 2011). 
174 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1151. 
175 Id. 
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the FISA Amendments Act because Respondents had engaged in 
similar measures to protect their communications even before the Act 
was enacted.176  Referring to the Court’s decision in Laird v. 
Tatum,177 the Court held that fear of surveillance and costs they 
incurred to avoid such surveillance could not establish standing.178 
Then Justice Alito reasoned that Respondents incorrectly 
compared the injuries they incurred to the injuries incurred by 
plaintiffs in previous cases where this Court upheld standing.179  In 
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc., 
the Court held that Friends of the Earth and Citizens Local 
Environmental Action Network (FOE) had standing because Laidlaw 
Environmental Services’ disposal of mercury into the waterway 
“directly affected [members of FOE’s] recreational, aesthetic, and 
economic interests.”180  Justice Alito distinguished this from 
Respondents’ case by pointing out that the unlawful discharges of 
mercury were ongoing, whereas in Respondents’ case, electronic 
                                                            
176 Id. at 1152. 
177 408 U.S. 1 (1972). 
178 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1152. 
179 Id. at 1153.  See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 
528 U.S. 167, 184 (2000) (holding that the plaintiffs had standing because “a 
company’s continuous and pervasive illegal discharges of pollutants into a river” 
causing nearby residents to “curtail their recreational use of that waterway and . . . 
subject[ing] them to other economic and aesthetic harm[]” were “concededly 
ongoing”); Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 475 (1987) (holding that the plaintiff 
had standing because he demonstrated that he “could not exhibit the films without 
incurring a risk of injury to his reputation and of an impairment of his political 
career.”); Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 156 (2010) 
(holding that conventional alfalfa farmers had standing because genetically 
engineered alfalfa seed fields were being plants within the bees’ pollination range). 
180 528 U.S. at 169.  Friends of the Earth and Citizens Local Environmental 
Action Network (FOE) filed suit against Laidlaw Environmental Services 
(Laidlaw) alleging noncompliance with the National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System (NPDES) permit, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, and 
an award of civil penalties.  Id. at 173–74.  NPDES permitted Laidlaw to discharge 
treated water but limited discharging pollutant; however, Laidlaw exceeded the 
limit on multiple occasions by discharging mercury into the waterway.  Id. at 176.  
Laidlaw argued that FOE lacked standing because FOE failed to show that any of 
their members faced the threat of any injury from Laidlaw’s activities.  Id. at 177. 
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surveillance of Respondents’ communication could be done through 
ways other than utilizing the FISA Amendments Act.181   
In Meese v. Keene, the Court held that Keene had standing 
because his personal, political, and professional reputation would 
suffer, and his ability to obtain re-election would be impaired if he 
were to exhibit the films marked as “political propaganda.”182  Meese 
was distinguished from Respondents’ case because in Meese, the 
films were already labeled as “political propaganda” and the labeling 
was regulated by the statute in question, whereas in Respondents’ 
case, it was mere speculation as to whether the government would 
subject Respondents’ communications to electronic surveillance 
using the FISA Amendments Act.183  In Monsanto Co v. Geertson 
Seed Farms, the Court held that the farmers did have standing to seek 
injunctive relief because if Roundup Ready Alfalfa were deregulated, 
farmers’ organic and conventional alfalfa crops would be infected 
with the engineered gene.184  Justice Alito distinguished this case 
from Respondents’ case because the farmers presented concrete 
evidence of fear that the genetically engineered alfalfa seeds were 
being planted in all the major alfalfa seed production areas well 
within the bees’ pollination range.185  With these three cases, Justice 
Alito seemed to emphasize that Respondents failed to provide 
sufficient evidence to trace their alleged injury to the FISA 
Amendments Act. 
Respondents alternatively argued that the government’s 
surveillance activities were insulated from judicial review.186  The 
Court disagreed with this argument.187  The Court held that the FISA 
Amendments Act is not insulated from judicial review because the 
                                                            
181 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1141. 
182 481 U.S. at 467.  A member of the California State Senate brought suit to 
enjoin the use of term “political propaganda” to certain Canadian Films, as required 
by Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938.  Id. at 473. 
183 Id. 
184 Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2752.  Farmers of conventional alfalfa challenged 
the decision of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) to 
deregulate a variety of genetically engineered alfalfa developed under license from 
Monsanto Company.  Id.  
185 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1154–55. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. 
    
474 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 34-2 
FISA Court “evaluates the [g]overnment’s certifications, targeting 
procedures, and minimization procedures.”188   
In the majority’s opinion, Respondents did not provide any 
concrete evidence to support their fear of future government 
surveillance, but mere speculation of possible government actions.189   
 
B. Justice Breyer’s Dissent 
 
Justice Breyer wrote the dissenting opinion in which Justice 
Ginsburg, Justice Sotomayor, and Justice Kagan joined.  Justice 
Breyer disagreed with the Court that the injury was too 
speculative.190  Justice Breyer listed three important ways the FISA 
Amendments Act changed FISA.191  With these changes, the 
government could obtain the FISA Court’s approval to conduct 
electronic surveillance on “communications between places within 
the United States and targets in foreign territories” by using “general 
targeting and privacy-intrusion minimization procedures,” as long as 
a significant purpose of the surveillance was to obtain foreign 
intelligence information.192  Combined with the kinds of 
communications Respondents engaged in, Justice Breyer argued that 
Respondents’ future harm was not speculative.193  He was convinced 
                                                            
188 Id. at 1154.  But cf. Nicholas J. Whilt, The Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act: Protecting the Civil Liberties that Make Defense of Our Nation 
Worthwhile, 35 SW. U. L. REV. 361, n.4 (2006).  Also, in FISA’s annual report to 
Congress in 2012, it indicates that 1,789 applications were filed requesting an 
authority to conduct electronic surveillance, and the FISA Court did not deny any 
of the 1,789 applications.  FISA’S 2012 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, 
https://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/2012rept.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2014). 
189 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1154. 
190 Id. at 1155 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
191 Id.  FISA Amendments Act: eliminated the requirement that the 
government describe to the [FISA Court] each specific target and identify each 
facility at which its surveillance would be directed, . . . [and] the requirement that a 
target [must] be a “foreign power or an agent of a foreign power,” [and it] 
diminished the [FISA Court’s] authority to insist upon, and eliminated its authority 
to supervise, instance-specific privacy-intrusion minimization procedures.  Id. at 
1156.   
192 Id. 
193 Id. at 1156–60.  At the time this suit was filed, Scott McKay was a lawyer 
representing Al-Hussayen, who is facing several civil cases, as well as criminal 
charges after the September 11 attacks.  Id. at 1156–57.  He was also representing 
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by Respondents’ contention that there was a “very high likelihood 
that Government, acting under the authority of [the FISA Amendment 
Act], [would] intercept at least some of the communications” 
engaged in by Respondents.194  First, he said that Respondents 
engaged in “electronic communications of a kind that the [FISA 
Amendments Act], but not the prior Act” would authorize.195  
Second, he said that Respondents had “a strong motive to engage in, 
and the [g]overnment [had] a strong motive to listen to, conversations 
of the kind described.”196  Third, he argued that the government’s 
past behavior showed that it was likely to pursue surveillance of 
electronic communications to seek information about terrorists and 
detainees.197  Lastly, he mentioned that the government had the 
capacity to conduct electronic surveillance because of the level of 
technology available to the government.198  Also, he pointed out that 
                                                            
Khalid Sheik Mohammed, a detainee before the military commissions at 
Guantanamo Bay.  Id. at 1157.  He communicated with these clients and other 
people located outside the United States via telephone and e-mail.  Id.  Sylvia 
Royce was an attorney representing Mohammedou Ould Salahi, a prisoner held at 
Guantanamo Bay.  Id.  She communicated with Ould Salahi’s brother, who was 
living in Germany.  Id.  Joanne Mariner is a human rights researcher and her work 
requires her to communicate via e-mail with people whom the CIA has said are 
associated with terrorist organizations.  Id. 
194 Id. Justice Breyer argues against Justice Alito’s arguments that the injury 
alleged by Respondents’ is speculative, concluding that it is not speculative.  Id. at 
1160. 
195 Id. at 1157–58. Compare with Justice Alito’s majority opinion where he 
argues that the injury cannot be fairly traceable to § 1881a since Respondents have 
taken similar measures to avoid surveillance even before FISA Amendments Act 
was passed. Id. at 1152. 
196 Id. at 1158.  Compare with Justice Alito’s majority opinion where he argues 
that it is speculative whether the government would target communications to 
which Respondents are parties. Id. at 1149–50. 
197 Id. at 1158.  Compare with Justice Alito’s majority opinion where he argues 
that Respondents can only speculate as to whether their own communications with 
their foreign contacts would be incidentally acquired. Id. at 1150. Justice Breyer 
argues that the nature of Respondents’ communication with their clients is likely to 
be targeted by the government. Id. at 1158. 
198 Id. at 1158–59. Compare with Justice Alito’s majority opinion where he 
argues that Respondents’ alleged future injury in speculative because it is unsure 
whether the government would succeed in obtaining information by conducting 
surveillance.  Id. at 1150. 
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the FISA Court rarely denied authorization of such surveillance.199  
Justice Breyer concluded that Respondents’ harm was not 
speculative.200 
Next, Justice Breyer criticized the way courts have used the 
standard of certainty as inconsistent.201  He reasoned that the 
certainty standard has never been the “touchstone of standing” 
because courts have granted injunctions and declaratory relief “aimed 
at preventing future activities that [were] reasonably likely or highly 
likely, but not absolutely certain, to take place.”202  Instead of the 
“certainly impending” standard for establishing standing in this case, 
he argued that the standard should be “reasonably likely or highly 
likely.”203  To support his argument that the Court was inconsistent 
with its use of the certainty standard, Justice Breyer considered 
previous cases in which the Court had used the certainly impending 
standard differently.204  In Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, the Court 
used the certainly impending standard as a sufficient, rather than a 
necessary, condition;205 in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Court 
used the phrase, “as if it concerned when, not whether, an alleged 
injury would occur.”206  The Court in Lujan held that the Plaintiff did 
not satisfy imminent injury because “‘soon’ might mean nothing 
more than ‘in this lifetime.’”207  However, the Court has referred to 
“reasonable probability” in numerous cases suggesting that imminent 
is not absolute.208   
                                                            
199 Id. at 1159.  Compare with Justice Alito’s majority opinion where he argues 
that it is speculative as to whether the FISA Court would authorize surveillance.  
Id. at 1150. 
200 Id. at 1160. 
201 Id. at 1160–61. 
202 Id. at 1160. 
203 Id. 
204 Id. 
205 Id. at 1160 (citing Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 593 
(1923)).  
206 Id. at 1160 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 555, 564 n.2 
(1992)). 
207 Id. at 1160 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564–65 n.2). 
208 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1160.  See Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 
561 U.S. 139 (2010); see also MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 
(2007); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167 
(2000); Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289 (1979). 
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Justice Breyer also discussed five Supreme Court cases in which 
the Court found standing when the injury was less than certain.209  In 
Pennell v. San Jose, a group of landlords sought a declaration that the 
new city ordinance—forbidding landlords to raise the rent charge by 
more than eight percent—was unconstitutional.210  The Court held 
that the landlords had standing because “the likelihood of 
enforcement of the [new ordinance] with the concomitant probability 
that a rent will be reduced . . . is a sufficient threat of actual injury to 
satisfy Art[icle] III’s requirement.”211  Justice Breyer, however, 
pointed out that the facts in Pennell did not amount to absolute 
certainty because it was uncertain whether landlords would be 
subjected to rent control under the new ordinance.212  In Blum v. 
Yaretsky, a group of nursing home residents challenged the regulation 
permitting their nursing home to transfer them to a less desirable 
home.213  The Court found that they had standing even though 
“Medicaid-initiated transfer had been enjoined and the nursing home 
itself had not threatened to transfer” them because the injury was not 
imaginary or speculative, but “quite realistic.”214  Justice Breyer was 
quick to note that the standard was “quite realistic,” far less than 
“certainly impending.”215  In Davis v. Federal Election Commission, 
the Court held that Davis, a self-financed candidate for the United 
States House of Representatives, had standing even though his 
opponent did not take advantage of the increased contribution limit 
allowed by the challenged statute.216  The Court reasoned that 
Davis’s injury was a “realistic and impending threat.”217  In 
MedImmune v. Genentech, a patent licensee sought a declaratory 
judgment (while he was making payments to the patent holder) that 
the patent was invalid.218  The Court held that the patent licensee had 
standing because the Court “assumed that if the [patent licensee] 
                                                            
209 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1161–62.  
210 485 U.S. 1, 4 (1988). 
211 Id. at 2. 
212 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1161. 
213 457 U.S. 991, 993 (1982).  
214 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1161, (reviewing Blum, 457 U.S. 991).  
215 Id. 
216  Id. at 1161–62 (reviewing Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724 (2008)). 
217 Id. 
218 549 U.S. 118, 120–21 (2007). 
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stopped making royalty payments it would have standing.”219  The 
Court applied the “genuine threat” of injury standard in MedImmune 
and Justice Breyer noted that the threat of injury in MedImmune was 
less certain than in that case.220  Lastly, in Duke Power Co. v. 
Carolina Environmental Study Group, a group of residents near a 
proposed nuclear power plant challenged the Price-Anderson Act that 
limited the plant’s liability in case of an accident.221  The Court held 
that the residents had standing because of their “exposure to radiation 
and the apprehension flowing from the uncertainty about the health 
and genetic consequences of even small emissions.”222  The Court 
found standing based on “probabilistic injuries.”223  Concluding that 
“certainly impending” means more of a “reasonable probability” or 
“high probability” rather than “absolute certainty,” Justice Breyer 
held that Respondents demonstrated sufficient future injury to meet 
the requirement.224 
 
VI. IMPACT 
This section explores the impact of the heightened standard for 
the injury-in-fact requirement on past and future cases and on public 
opinion.  The majority opinion’s “certainly impending” standard 
analysis raised concerns among environmentalists who deal with 
environmental issues that are probabilistic in nature and others who 
seek to challenge other statutes based on future harm.225  The ruling 
in Clapper also brought mixed opinions about government power: 
those who believe that national security and civil liberties are still 
balanced and those who are concerned with a lack of judicial review.  
 
                                                            
219 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1162 (reviewing MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 118). 
220 Id. 
221 438 U.S. 59, 81 (1978). 
222 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1162 (quoting Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 74). 
223 Id. 
224 Id. at 1165. 
225 Patrick Gallagher, Environmental Law, Clapper v. Amnesty International, 
USA and the Vagaries of Injury-in-fact: “Certainly Impending” Harm, 
“Reasonable Concern,” and “Geographic Nexus”, 32 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y 1 (2014). 
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A. Legal Impact 
 
The decision in Clapper raised the standard for the “imminent 
injury” element.  To establish future injury for the purposes of 
satisfying Article III standing, the claimant has to show that the 
injury is certainly impending.226  Although the Court argued that the 
standard has always been “certainly impending” for future injury to 
constitute the injury-in-fact element,227 as Justice Breyer pointed out, 
the Court used lower standards in previous cases.228  Nonetheless, the 
Court in Clapper clearly stated that future injury has to be certainly 
impending.229  That clear statement, however, raised concerns for 
environmental law.230  Sierra Club’s Legal Director, Patrick 
Gallagher, in reviewing the Clapper decision, opined that Clapper 
“muddie[d] an already confusing body of law.”231  First, he said the 
Court in Clapper “heightened . . . the level of proof required for 
standing,” and second, he said the Court “improperly merge[d] the 
doctrine of ‘certainly impending’ harm with the doctrine of 
‘reasonable concern.’”232  Gallagher was concerned the Clapper 
decision would create an additional barrier for environmentalists, so 
he set out to clarify Clapper as applied to environmental law.233  
Agreeing with Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion in Clapper, 
Gallagher argued that “a ‘certainty’ test [—as used by Justice Alito in 
his majority opinion in Clapper—] makes little sense” when the harm 
is inherently probabilistic—such as an environmental issue.234  
Instead of taking quantitative measures of the risk of harm, courts 
should look to qualitative measures, such as Congress’s intent behind 
the statute in question and the seriousness of the harm.235  Gallagher 
also distinguished “reasonable concern” from “certainly impending 
                                                            
226 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147. 
227 Id.  Citing Monsanto and Whitmore, Justice Alito claimed that anticipated 
future injury must be certainly impending.  Id. 
228 Id. at 1161. 
229 Id. 1147. 
230 Gallagher, supra note 225. 
231 Id. at 4. 
232 Id. 
233 Id. 
234 Id. at 17. 
235 Id. at 17–20. 
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harm” by showing that in Laidlaw, the Court viewed the plaintiff’s 
reasonable concern for the defendant’s violations of law rather than 
imminence of actual harm to the plaintiffs.236  Thus, Respondents in 
Clapper did not have standing, not because some harm was not 
certainly impending, but because they could not provide sufficient 
evidence to trace possible government surveillance to the FISA 
Amendments Act.237 
The ruling in Clapper seems to strengthen FISA by creating a 
higher bar to challenging the Act.  Because the whole procedure of 
obtaining authorization is so secretive, most people are not aware that 
their communication is under the government’s surveillance unless 
the information gathered by the government is used against them in a 
criminal proceeding.238  If Respondents, who frequently engaged in 
international electronic communications with people who were likely 
targets under the FISA Amendments Act, could not meet the 
certainly impending standard, then who else can satisfy that 
standard?  Unless the government actually conducted electronic 
surveillance under the FISA Amendments Act and the targeted 
person became aware of the surveillance (mostly likely in a criminal 
case if the government acknowledged their use of electronic 
surveillance under the FISA Amendments Act),239 it seems unlikely 
that anyone would have standing to challenge the FISA Amendments 
Act.  Citing Clapper as a precedent, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that the plaintiffs in Hedges v. 
Obama lacked standing.240  A group of journalists and activists 
(Plaintiffs) challenged the constitutionality of the National Defense 
Authorization Act of 2012 (NDAA), which allowed “the President to 
detain anyone who was part of, or has substantially supported, al-
                                                            
236 Id. at 24.  
237 Id. at 25. 
238 Banks, supra note 1, at 1231. 
239 Jamid Muhtorov, charged with giving material aid to the Islamic Jihad 
Union, became the first criminal defendant to be informed that the government 
would be using information obtained under the FISA Amendments Act since its 
passage in 2008.  Andrea Peterson, Warrantless Wiretapping has Managed to Duck 
Significant Judicial Review. Until Now., WASH. POST, (Jan. 30, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/01/30/warrantless-
wiretapping-has-managed-to-duck-significant-judicial-review-until-now/. 
240 Hedges v. Obama, 724 F.3d 170, 204–05 (2d Cir. 2013). 
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Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces” without trial.241  Similar to 
Respondents in Clapper, Plaintiffs’ profession required them to 
communicate with persons who were likely to be categorized as 
hostile to the United States, and thus they feared they might be 
detained under the NDAA.242  The Second Circuit held that Plaintiffs 
did not have standing due to failure to show “sufficient threat that the 
government w[ould] detain them” under the NDAA.243 
 
B. Social Impact 
 
In his analysis of the Clapper decision, Rush Atkinson, an 
attorney at the U.S. Department of Justice, opined that Clapper 
“simply allows the government to continue foreign surveillance in 
the same fashion it has conducted such surveillance for over seventy 
years.”244  The Court’s decision on the standing doctrine did not have 
any impact on the government’s power to conduct surveillance under 
the FISA Amendments Act.245  He argued that, if anything, the 
Clapper decision “incentivizes the government to use warrantless 
surveillance sparingly . . . and encourages the use of intelligence 
warrants whenever possible.”246  However, encouraging the 
government to obtain a warrant for surveillance does not necessarily 
mean it is keeping a proper balance between Americans’ civil liberty 
and national security.  This is because under the FISA Amendments 
Act, the government could probably easily obtain warrants for 
surveillances that are highly likely to target Americans.  There are 
provisions under the FISA Amendments Act that are designed to 
prohibit the government from violating Americans’ civil liberties.247  
But it also has provisions that offset those safeguards.248  Referring to 
the time before FISA was enacted, Yoo argued that if Presidents were 
                                                            
241 Id. at 173. 
242 Hedges v. Obama, 890 F.Supp.2d 424, 433 (2012). 
243 Hedges v. Obama, 724 F.3d at 174. 
244 Rush Atkinson, The Fourth Amendment’s National Security Exception: Its 
History and Limits, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1343, 1403 (2013). 
245 Id.  
246 Id. at 1404. 
247 50 U.S.C. §§ 1881a(b), 1881a(g), 1881a(i) (2012).  
248 See supra Part II.C for discussion regarding how the FISA Amendments 
Act offsets additional protections added. 
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able to monitor communications concerning national security threats 
without a warrant “in peacetime,” then the executive authority has all 
the more reason to do the same when the nation is at war with 
terrorists.249  Yet, the very reason the nation needed FISA in the first 
place was to set a boundary for Presidents’ discretion and to balance 
Americans’ civil liberties with national security.  The FISA 
Amendments Act seems to have taken a step further away from this 
balance.   
Some viewed the Clapper ruling as a “‘get out of jail free’ card 
for national security statutes that are written . . . with an eye toward 
secrecy” and are concerned that the ruling will not only affect 
people’s ability to “challenge the constitutionality” of the FISA 
Amendments Act, but also other secret government programs.250  
Adam Liptak, a Supreme Court correspondent for the New York 
Times, also opined that the Clapper ruling “illustrated how hard it is 
to mount court challenges to a wide array of antiterrorism measures . 
. . in light of the combination of government secrecy and judicial 
doctrines limiting access to the court.”251  The FISA Amendments 
Act was a four-year statute, scheduled to expire in 2012, but it was 
extended until 2017.252 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
As Neil Richards253 pointed out in his article, “The Dangers of 
Surveillance,” people like the benefits of surveillance, yet are fearful 
of its costs.254  Most people would probably agree that the 
government should have the power to conduct surveillance in order 
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250 Matt Sledge, Supreme Court’s Clapper v. Amnesty International Decision 
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to protect the nation.  How much power the government should have 
is the question.  FISA was originally passed to keep a balance 
between “protecting civil liberties and . . . national security.”255  
However, Congress has amended FISA numerous times within the 
past two decades, arguably tipping the balance in favor of national 
security.  With all the changes the FISA Amendments Act brought, 
one could argue that Congress tried to keep that balance.  
Surveillance under the FISA Amendments Act is subject to (1) 
statutory conditions,256 (2) judicial authorization,257 (3) congressional 
supervision,258 and (4) compliance with the Fourth Amendment.259  
But how effective is this safeguard in protecting Americans’ privacy?  
When compared with FISA of 1978, the FISA Amendments Act is 
more lenient with the government, possibly subjecting Americans to 
surveillance.  Some argue that changes to FISA were necessary to 
equip the government in the war on terror, while others argue that the 
changes are unconstitutional.  Regardless, Congress has modified 
FISA, giving more power to the government.  On top of the 
government-favored changes to the Act, the decision in Clapper tips 
the scale even more towards the government by requiring certainly 
impending injury to challenge the FISA Amendments Act. 
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